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encrypt the message using any suitable algorithm.  As all nodes share the same key the message could 
be  authenticated  by  every  node  on  the  route  to  the  BS.    Whilst this solution is simple it is not 
particularly  effective  because  if  a  single  node  is  compromised  then  the  entire  network  is 
compromised.  As well as the security concerns raised by having a globally shared key there are also 
problems of scalability [34].   
One possible solution to the problem of all nodes in the network sharing the same key is to provide 
a mechanism by which the key may be periodically changed.  One method by which this can be 
achieved is described in [35].   The approach taken is to split the network into clusters in order to 
reduce the complexity of key management.  Once the network has been split, a node in each cluster is 
elected as the cluster head (CH).  These CH then form a back-bone network for the system. From this 
back-bone of CH a key manager is elected.  Once the process of electing a key manager is complete 
the manager can generate a key and distribute it to all the other nodes in the network via the CH, this 
key is then used for all communication.  Whilst this system has exactly the same weaknesses as the 
globally shared key system the fact the key can be changed regularly and reduces the risk of it being 
compromised by packet sniffing, as the volume of traffic transmitted with each key will be lower.  
This method also allows different levels of security to be supported, as if a particular network has 
higher security requirements then the key could be updated more regularly than for a network with 
less rigorous security requirements. 
The  Security  Protocols  for  Sensor  Networks  (SPINS)  [12]  protocol  consists  of two  sub  parts: 
Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and µTELSA (a minimal implementation of the TELSA 
protocol).  The system makes the assumption that the BS is trusted and only communication between 
the BS and the nodes (in either direction) needs to be encrypted.  In order to make sure that keys are 
not reused for the encryption of data the nodes share a master key and use it for the generation of 
encryption keys.  SNEP relies on each communicating node having a shared counter, which enables 
weak freshness to be ensured and protects against replay attacks.  It is however possible for these 
counters to become inconsistent, so there is a protocol to resynchronise the counters, and if necessary 
the counter can also be sent with each message. The encryption algorithm chosen for use in the SPINS 
project is RC5 which was chosen because of its “small code size and high efficiency” [12].  The RC5 
algorithm is used in counter mode, meaning the cipher text is exactly the same length as the plain text 
which means there is no transmission overhead in sending the encrypted data when compared to 
sending the plain text.  Using the counter mode also has the advantage that if the same message is sent 
multiple times the encrypted texts will be different. 
The Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) [23] is another encryption scheme 
which can offer different levels of security for different types of message, which can be achieved 
because each node has to store 4 different types of key.  Every node has an individual key which is 
shared only with the BS.  Each node will also have a copy of the group key, which is shared by all the 
nodes on the system.  This key is usually used for the BS to send out broadcasts to the nodes.  The 
third key that a node has is the cluster key: a key shared by the node and its neighbours which means 
that local broadcast messages can be secured.  The final type of key that a node will have are the pair-
wise shared keys.  Each node will have a pair-wise shared key for each of its neighbours.   By using 
these different keys the messages sent can be protected to different extents.  LEAP also implements 
µTELSA to enable broadcast messages from the BS to be secured.  In order to authenticate a message 
the sending node signs it with its cluster key and transmits it.  When this message is received by 
another node it is verified using the relevant cluster key, the data is then authenticated with its own 
cluster key and then forwarded on to the next node. 